Foreign exchange markets are the most liquid financial markets in practice. The traded volume has even increased within the last years: the daily average turnover on the foreign exchange spot market has surged to 621 billion US dollar in 2004 (cf. the triennial central bank survey by Galati et al. (2005)).
But the enormous trading volume is not the only striking feature of currency markets: the prices of the currencies, that is, the exchange rates, also incorporate information very rapidly. This yields volatility. It can not be denied that instable exchange rates can have dire consequences for whole economies.
Exchange rate uncertainty affects international trade, the liquidity of firms which have foreign debts, the behavior of foreign investors, and even fiscal, domestic, and monetary policy. In general, excess price volatility decreases the willingness of investors to engage in trading activities in the concerned markets. Currency speculation is not the only factor in exchange rate determination, although it seems to have an influence on the short-term development of a currency’s value. There
exist different sights on the influence of speculative currency trade on exchange rates.
In 1936, John M. Keynes partitioned trading parties on financial markets in long-run investors and short-run speculators, whereas speculators play a price-destabilizing role on the market. In his fundamental work The general theory of employment, interest, and money, he pointed out that the imposing of a transaction tax on markets could increase the weight of long-term fundamentals of the assets against speculators’ guesses of the short-term behavior of other speculators, thus stabilizing the asset’s price.
Friedman (1953) contrasts that stabilizing speculation is equivalent to profitable speculation: If speculators buy an asset when its price is low and respectively sell it when its price is high, this will drive the asset’s price towards its equilibrium. This sight on the relation between speculation and stabilisation seems tenuous. For example, de Long et al. (1990)find that because noise traders can earn higher profits than long term investors and both types of speculators are trading, Friedman’s model appears incomplete. Carlson and Osler (2000) argue that Friedman’s line of reasoning does neither incorporate interest rates nor a risk model, which both could in fact make speculators sell an asset when its price is low and buy it when its price is high, thus destabilizing the price.
In general, most post-Keynesian authors assert the opposite of Friedman’s theory. 1 see Keynes (1936) How can one cope with price volatility? In this article, we focus on a transaction taxation scheme. Sticking to the example of foreign exchange markets, there is a constantly ongoing discussion about imposing transaction costs to reduce exchange rate variation.
James Tobin (1978) proposed a transaction tax of up to 1 percent on all spot transactions. He hoped not to affect long-term investors, but to scare away short-term speculators with his tax. The desired effects of such a tax on short-term and long-term currency traders can be illustrated in an example which has been drawn up by Frankel(1996):
Consider a home interest rate of ten percent and a transaction tax in the height of one percent. A foreign asset is attractive to potential investors with an investment horizon of one year if it yielded at least 11.11 percent per annum if only the interest
earnings were brought back.
If the horizon was only one month, the asset should yieldat least 22.12 percent annual revenue to remain attractive. The shorter the horizon, the higher the asset yield has to be: A duration of the investment of one week would require a yield of 62.52 percent, and if it was a one-day investment the yield would have to be no less than 378.68 percent.
This approach is highly controversial. In their comprehensive standard work, Grunberg et al. (1996) review current arguments for and against this tax from an economic point of view. Major points of critics are for example that it would be easy to evade the tax by means of financial engineering (e. g., short-termed futures are not subject to this tax) or by shifting markets to countries where the tax is not imposed. Furthermore, Aliber et al. (2003) find in an empirical study that higher transaction costs are positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. Hau (2006) studies data from the Paris stock exchange and comes to a similar conclusion. Spahn (1996) extends Tobin’s taxation scheme by modelling a two-tier transaction taxation scheme: like in Tobin’s approach, a fixed percentage of up to 1 percent is imposed on all currency spot transactions.
If however the exchange rate lies out of the boundaries of a pre-calculated threshold determined by a crawling peg plus a safety margin, a transaction tax with a significantly higher tax rate of up to 100 percent will be imposed on the transactions. Spahn calls his approach a Tobin-cum-Circuit-Breaker Tax. A more detailed view on this approach is provided bySpahn (2002). Already in the same issue of the journal in which Spahn initially published his taxation proposal, Janet Stotsky (1996) animadverts his approach. She claims that 3 variable taxation rates would increase uncertainty on the market, spreads, as well as the administrative burden for tax payers and tax authority.
Furthermore, in her opinion the levy of the tax as an instrument of monetary policy under the control of the fiscal authority would require a high extent of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities which she claims does not exist in practice.
In the context of politics, the concept of a Tobin tax is reoccurring in discussions frequently; especially in European countries and after financial crises. The interest in
the Tobin tax soon dies once the media coverage on financial crises ceases to exist. Asmall anecdote describes this phenomenon best. Otmar Issing, chief economist of the German Bundesbank in 1990-98, once told journalists when asked about the Tobin tax “Oh, that again. It’s the Loch Ness Monster, popping up once more.”. Nevertheless, some hesitant steps towards such a tax are taken. In 2004, France and Belgium agreed to introduce a Tobin tax as soon as all other countries of the European Union will do.
Germany, France, and Austria claimed pro-Tobin tax positions only in 2005, knowing that if the European Union levied a Tobin tax it would have an own source of fiscal
revenues. On the American continent, Brazil’s president Luiz In´acio Lula da Silva,Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez, as well as the Canadian House of Commons spoke out in favor of the Tobin tax within the previous 8 years. At the moment, one of the major adversaries of the Tobin tax is the United States of America. It is unlikely that a Tobin tax will be effective if introduced multilaterally without participation of the USA.
There exist different views on the impact of a Tobin tax on financial crises. Whereas some authors, e. g. Tobin (1996a), claim that financial crises caused by an inadequate
monetary and fiscal policy mix and sparked off by speculative attacks could at least have been curbed by a transaction tax, some authors assert the opposite.